Dissent Networks, State Repression, and Strategic Clemency for Defection

Why do governments severely punish some dissidents while showing mercy to others? This study argues that when constrained by limited information on dissent, states have incentives to cast the net of repression wider by executing not just key dissent actors but also members closely connected to them to ensure demobilization. States also crave information, and granting clemency to defectors who bring in information improves state intelligence. Given that tips have different values, regimes will grant clemency to defectors who are closely connected to key dissent actors and possess high-value tips, allowing the state to pursue top fugitives and dissolve resistance more efficiently. Using newly declassified data on political victims during Taiwan’s White Terror authoritarian period, I find that the regime tends to execute both key actors (i.e., leaders and recruiters) and their closely connected members. Defectors who share information tend to receive mercy, but defectors closely connected to key actors are much less likely to face execution than less connected defectors. These findings shed new insight into the toolkit dictators use to gather intelligence on dissent and how strategic clemency induces defection and betrayal among dissidents, helping destroy dissent networks from within.

為什麼政府對某些異議分子執行嚴厲的懲罰，而對其他人表現出仁慈？這項研究主張，當政府因為對異議情報的了解有限時，便有動機擴大鎮壓的範圍，不僅處決關鍵的異議行動者，也處決與他們密切相關的成員，以確保解散其活動。政府同時也渴望獲取情報，對那些提供情報的叛逃者給予寬免，可以增強國家的情報能力。鑑於情報的價值各異，政權將對那些與關鍵異議行動者有密切聯繫且擁有高價值情報的叛逃者給予寬免，讓國家能更有效地追捕頂尖逃犯並瓦解抵抗力量。使用台灣白色恐怖時期政治受害者的新解密數據，本文發現政權傾向於處決關鍵行動者（即領導人和招募者）及其密切相關的成員。提供情報的叛逃者通常會獲得憐憫，但與關鍵行動者密切相關的叛逃者面臨處決的可能性遠低於聯繫較少的叛逃者。這些發現為獨裁者如何收集異議情報的工具箱提供了新的見解，以及戰略性的寬免如何促使異議分子叛逃和背叛，幫助從內部摧毀異議網絡。