The Law or the Career? Autocratic Judiciaries, Strategic Sentencing, and Political Repression

Why do judges sometimes act against autocrats’ will, even without judicial independence and tenure security? Contrary to the theory of strategic defection under weak governments, we argue that this behavior can also emerge under strong governments with lax monitoring. When autocrats primarily monitor severe political cases, judges can strategically downplay case severity to avoid oversight, thereby increasing judicial autonomy and the rule of law. Yet, these adjustments will be carefully calibrated–sufficient to evade scrutiny but not too drastic to trigger autocrats’ suspicions and incur sanctions against judges. We test this expectation with new data on Taiwan’s military trials during authoritarian rule, finding that judges tend not to issue sentences above a review threshold after its introduction. Sentence reductions are mostly moderate, affecting cases where sentences can fall slightly above or below the threshold under judges’ discretion. These findings have implications for understanding state repression and judicial agency in nondemocracies.

為什麼在缺乏司法獨立和任期保障的條件下，法官有時還會違背獨裁者的意願？與既有理論假設弱政府中會有戰略性叛逃的理論相反，我們認為這種行為也可能發生在監管鬆懈的強政府之下。當獨裁者主要關注重大政治案件時，法官可以策略性地降低案件的嚴重性，從而增強司法自主性和法治的實行。然而，這種判決嚴重度的調整通常會保持在適當的範圍內，既足以規避審查，又不至於過分激進以至於招致獨裁者的猜疑和懲罰。我們利用台灣威權統治時期的軍事審判新數據來驗證這一假設，結果顯示，引入監督門檻後，法官判決被告超過監督門檻的概率降低。這些判刑的減輕通常是適度的，根據法官的裁量權涉及可能略高於審查門檻的案件進行輕微的向下調整。這些發現對於理解威權政權下國家的鎮壓力度及司法機構的行為具有重要的啟示意義。